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                                               CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background  
Kenya has embarked on a constitutional making process that is hoped to ensure a transition to 
democracy. The current constitution making process is not the first of its kind in post 
independence Kenya.1 Since the Lancaster House Conference2 that gave Kenya its very first 
constitution after independence, constitution making processes have been fraught with 
controversies.3 The periods after independence saw the Kenyans glamour for constitutional 
change and reforms.4 A number of amendments have been effected to the Kenyan constitution 
since independence. The clamor for constitutional review gradually grew leading to the repeal of 
section 2A of the Constitution in 1991 which restored multi-parties.5 The pressure from civil 
society organizations in 1997 led to the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission Act6 and this was considered as the formal beginning of the Constitutional Review 
Process in Kenya.7 The next major constitutional review process came in after the end of the 
term of President Daniel Arap Moi in 2002.   A review process, commonly known as the 
                                                 
1  AN Abdirizak   Constitutional Making and Legal Reform Processes in Kenya (2004) 2 
at<http://www.indiana.edu/~wow3/papers/wow3_nunow.pdf> (accessed 15  August 2009) 
2  Lancaster is situated in London and it was there that the negotiations and adoption of the first Kenyan 
constitution took place. That was between the British government and the representatives of the Kenyan 
Legislative Council. The first conference was chaired by Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian Macleod, 
in 1960 but did not result in an agreement, leading McLeod to issue an interim constitution.  The second 
conference took place in February 1962 and a framework for self-governance was negotiated while the 
third conference of 1963 finalized constitutional arrangements for Kenya’s independence as a dominion, 
marking the end of more than 70 years of colonial rule. 
3  K Kindiki The Emerging jurisprudence on Kenya’s constitutional review law Kenya Law Review (2007) 
115. 
4  Abdirizak (n 1 above) 2.  
5  Kindiki  (n 3 above) 153. 
  6  The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act of 1997  as amended in 2000 and 2001.The 
Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act 1997, and the Statute Law (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 1997.  
7  Kindiki (n 3 above) 153. The pressure group was spearheaded by the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group 
(IPPG). 
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Bomas8, ensued but the Bomas draft constitution was rejected through a referendum.9 As a 
result, the prospects of Kenya having a constitution before the 2007 elections disappeared and, 
it seemed, there was no prospect of a new constitution before elections. Throughout these series 
of constitutional amendments and reforms, the major question that has been asked is the 
involvement of the Kenyan people in the successive constitutional reform process that took 
place since independence, casting doubt on the ownership of the successive constitutional 
amendments by the people of Kenya.10  
 
In December 2007, Kenyans went to elections which were later marred by violence that resulted 
in loss of lives.11 It is often argued that the lack of constitutional reforms was at the centre of the 
post election violence.12  An important part of the agreement that brought the violence to an end 
is the drafting of a new constitution. 13 In accordance with the road map agreed among the 
parties on 4th March 2008, the constitutional review process is supposed to be completed 
within a period of 12 months.14  
 
2. Statement of the problem 
The Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008 provides a legal framework for the making of a new 
constitution. The Review Act provides for the organs to facilitate the process and sets out the 
procedures according to which the four organs15  will work and how the referendum will be 
                                                 
8  The Bomas ground was the place where the stake holder negotiations and discussions on the draft took 
place. The draft was later named after the Bomas grounds. 
9  Kindiki (n 3  above) 153. 
10  Abdizirak (n 1 above) 2. 
11  Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Report, on the brink of the precipice: a human Rights 
account of Kenya’s post -2007 Election violence (2008) 123. 
12  ‘Kenya in crisis available at  
              < http://www.internaldisplacement.org/Kenya+in+Crisis.pdf> (accessed on 21  February  2008) 
13   The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediated by Koffi Annan as Chair and the panel of 
eminent African personalities saw the agreement between the factions on the statement of principles on 
long term issues and solutions and among which was Constitutional, institutional and legal reform. 
14  Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Preamble of Statement of Principles on long term issues 
and solutions, signed 23rd may 2008 1.  
15   The Constitution of Kenya Review Act 2008 section 5 provides for the Committee of Experts, the 
Parliamentary Select Committee, The National Assembly and the Referendum (people of Kenya). 
 
 
 
 
 3 
conducted.16  A Committee of Experts (CoE) has been selected and divergent views have 
appeared on who decides the contentious issues and to what extent the people should get 
involved in the process. 
 The Committee of Experts will not go to every constituency like the previous Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission prior to the National Constitutional Conference known as the 
Bomas.17  The identification of contentious issues and consultations with reference groups is 
supposed to take 160 days.18  
 Constitution making becomes complex when constitutional reforms happen during a post 
conflict scenario and where constitutions themselves are ‘a pact’ that seeks to end periods of 
protracted conflict.19 Constitution making processes in countries at risk of internal violence 
poses difficulties because decision making is highly contested and the trust essential to 
compromise may be absent.20 Considering the fact that it is a  constitution making process  that 
is happening at the back drop of the recent 2007 post election violence , the current process of 
making the constitution in Kenya is as equally important, if not more, as the end product in  
strengthening democracy and achieving relative peace in Kenya.21  The present research focuses 
on the procedural aspect of the constitution making that is currently underway in Kenya and 
examines the consultative nature of the process. It specifically looks to what extent the process 
involves the people of Kenya.  
   
3. Focus and objectives of the study  
This research seeks to evaluate the current constitutional making process in Kenya. It focuses on 
the process undertaken by the coalition government in Kenya and the extent to which the people 
of Kenya have been involved in the process. 
 
                                                 
16  The Constitution of Kenya Review Act (2008). 
17  The Standard  (n 22  above) 29. 
18   The Standard  (n 22  above) 29. 
19  <http://verfassungsweldel.files.worldpress.com/2008/07/simeon.pdf> 14 (accessed 14   August 2009). 
20   See  Simeon (n 19  above) 14. 
21  M Ndulo Constitutional making in Africa: Assessing both the process and the content (2001) 113. 
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4. Significance of the study  
This study is important because the current coalition government in Kenya is expected to deliver 
a constitution before Kenya goes to elections in 2012. It is hoped that this study contributes to 
the constitutional making process that is currently underway in Kenya. It emphasis the point 
that a people driven process is necessary if governments that have suffered political violence and 
instability are to become stable and inclusive. T Furthermore, evaluating the Constitutional 
making process in Kenya would contribute to constitution making in states like Zimbabwe that 
are undertaking constitutional reforms in order to restore democracy and the rule of law.  
 
4. Delineations and limitations 
This study intends to analyse the current constitutional making process in Kenya under the 
coalition government.  The study will only evaluate the procedural aspect of constitution making 
in Kenya. It does not look at substantive issues that dominate some of the constitutional debate 
in that country.  
 
5.    Methodology  
This study will mainly adopt a library based research. The work will involve the analysis of the 
existing literature on Kenya‘s constitution making process and an evaluation of the process 
undertaken today by the coalition government. The existing legislation in Kenya and the 
Constitutional Review Act of 2008 will be important for this study. 
 
6. Literature Review  
In the last decade, constitutional making in the world has assumed prominence and great 
importance in the quest for democracy and good governance.22 Modern constitution making 
requires the participation of ordinary people. This has introduced the concept of ownership by 
the majority as a fundamental prerequisite to the legitimacy of institutions and governments.23 
                                                 
22  HH Mavuto Popular involvement in the Constitution making: experience of Malawi, paper presented at 
the World Congress of Constitutional law, Athens, Greece, 11-15 August (2007)3.  
23  Mavuto  (n 22 above) 3. 
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Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai examined the constitutional making process in Kenya prior to 2005 
and the notion of popular participation especially with reference to marginalized ethnic groups 
in Kenya.24 They demonstrated how high levels of people‘s participation can be curtailed by 
those in power.25  
Morris Odhiambo is of the opinion that the regime that come to power after President Daniel 
Arap Moi was reformist and despite the challenges constitutional reforms would take place 
gradually.26 However, his prediction never materialized and in 2005 the Draft Constitution was 
rejected by the people of Kenya through a referendum.   
Lawrence Mute27 and Wanza Kioko28 argued that the delays and failures in constitutional 
review would be used to entrench status quo and avail all powers to the president setting a bad 
precedent for Kenya. Mwagiru provides a narrative account of the post election violence and 
takes us through the constitutional issues pertaining to the process of negotiations that led to 
the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act.29  Ongaro and Ambani discuss the 
importance of constitutionalism in Kenya and its relevance in healing ethnic divisions that 
characterise Kenyan politics.30 Kindinki31 ‘s analysis of the emerging jurisprudence on Kenya‘s 
constitutional Review law and Muli‘s 32 analysis of the legal and political processes involved in 
the Bomas will provide some lessons into an inquiry of the current constitutional review 
process. Mutua takes us through the dilemma of constitutional making in Kenya and his work is 
relevant especially as he takes on the aspirations of the Kenyan people in the advent of the Mwai 
Kibaki era and the challenges to constitutional making in Kenya after the 2007 post election 
                                                 
24   J Cottrell & Y Ghai Constitution making and democratization in Kenya (2000–2005) (2007) 1. 
25  J Cottrell & Y Ghai (n 23 above) 2. 
26  M Odhiambo Constitutionalism under a reformist regime in Kenya: One Step forward, two steps 
backwards? (2004) 141. 
27   L Mute  Constitutionalism in East Africa (2004) 11. 
28   W Kioko   The State of constitutional development in Kenya (2003) 15. 
29  M Mwagiru (n 16 above) 157. 
30  See B Ongaro, O Ambani ‘Constitutionalism as a panacea to ethnic divisions in Kenya: A post election 
crisis‘s perspective’ in GW Mukundi (ed) Ethnicity, human rights and constitutionalism in Africa 
(2008) 27.   
31   Kindiki (n 3 above) 153. 
32  K Muli The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004 (Bomas Draft): Reflections and commentary on the issues of 
content and process (2009)2 available at <http://wikileaks.org/wiki/images/Kenya-bomas.pdf> (accessed 8 
august 2009).  
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violence 33 However, recent studies on constitutional making under coalition governments and 
specifically Kenya are still lacking. 
In sum, there has been a lot of literature on constitution making processes in Africa and Kenya 
in particular. The authors have discussed the need to involve the people in constitution making 
processes as a basis for legitimacy and ownership. The  authors on Kenya ‘s constitutional 
history have not yet analysed the  constitution making process that is currently taking place 
under the coalition government. It is this gap that this study seeks to address. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  M Mutua   Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming the Leviathan (2008) 117. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 THE ROAD TO CONSTITUTION MAKING IN KENYA 
 
2.1    The independence constitution: The Kenyatta regime (1963-1978) 
Kenya gained its independence from Britain on 12 December 1963.34 The 1963   Constitution of 
Kenya, also known as the Lancaster Constitution, provided for a multiparty democracy and a 
decentralised form of governance.  The Kenyan legislature was not directly involved in drafting 
of the constitution, much less the people of Kenya.35 Despite the lack of popular participation 
that characterised its making, Kibara argues that the Lancaster Constitution was regarded by 
some as ‘a fairly progressive liberal Constitution because it provided for checks and balances as 
well the devolution of powers’.36  The post independence leadership in Kenya immediately 
amended the Constitution to create the post of President, abolishing that of Prime-Minister.37  
This represented the first amendment in 1963 and Kenya was declared a republic with an 
executive president who wields enormous powers.38  
The position of Prime Minister, which had facilitated power-sharing, was scrapped and so was 
the regional assemblies that were designed to share power with the two Houses of Parliament, 
namely, the Senate and the House of Representatives.39 President Kenyatta abolished multiparty 
democracy and created a defacto one party state.40 These changes were followed by successive 
enactments and   amendments that concentrated power in the hands of the president, 
undermining the capacity of the judiciary and parliament to hold the executive accountable. 41 
The concentration of power in the executive contrasts to the Lancaster Constitution that was 
largely based on an entrenched separation of powers.42 
                                                 
34  B A Ogot & W R Ocheing (eds) Decolonization and independence of Kenya (1995) 54. 
35  Abdirizak (n 1 above)   2. 
36  G Kibara The State of constitutionalism in Kenya (2003) 2 available at                     
<www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/Constm%202003%20Kibara%20K.pdf> (accessed 7 September 2009). 
37  Kibara ( 36  above) 2. 
38   Kibara (n 36  above) 2. 
39   Kibara  ( 36  above) 3 
40  C Leys Underdevelopment in Kenya: The political economy of neo-colonialism (1975) 212. 
41  Inter Africa Group, Conference on Constitutionalism and human security in the horn of Africa Sheraton 
Addis, 1st October, 2007 (2007) 17. 
42  Mutua (n 33  above) 62. 
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For the purpose of this study, it suffices to note that the post independence constitution 
remained a tool of political manipulation by the elite of the time.  The people remained in 
the background and the amendments were usually spearheaded by the executive. The death 
of the leading father of the nation Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 saw President Daniel Arap Moi 
coming to power.43 
 
2.2.   The Moi Period (1978- 2002)  
After the death of President Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, power was transferred to the then vice 
president Daniel Arap Moi. As mentioned above, the independence constitution of Kenya went 
through significant revisions. The Moi era also saw further amendments to the Constitution.  
President Daniel Arap Moi‘s term of office saw the strict censorship of the opposition and denial 
of the public the opportunity to participate in the democratic process. This included the 
repealing of a constitutional provision which turned Kenya into a one party state.44 These 
changes, which, for all intents and purposes, were driven by personal interests of the ruling 
class, undermined the fundamental values and principles underlying the post independence 
constitution that had provided for a power sharing regime and political participation.45 Civil 
society organisations did not enjoy free political space and they were rather intimidated by the 
strong government machinery. Civil society organizations had no role in the constitutional 
development since most of them had been intimidated into silence through de-registration, 
denial of licence and those that remained active had been incorporated into state apparatus and 
programmes.46  
 
2.3. From defacto one party state to de jure one party state 
In 1982, the ruling KANU regime enacted a constitutional provision, section 2A amendment, 
which turned Kenya from a defacto one party state to a dejure one party state.47 The section, 
                                                 
43   Mutua (n 54 above) 65. 
44  Repeal of section 2A of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya. 
45  GK Kuria The Constitutional implications of the East African cooperation in, K Kibwana, (ed) Human 
rights and democracy in East Africa: The Constitutional Implications of East Africa cooperation 
(1997)33. 
46  A Fowler Political dimensions of NGO expansion in eastern and southern Africa and the role of 
international Aid (1990) 60. 
47  Abdirizak (n 1 above) 1 
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which was strongly opposed by the civil society and academia, outlawed political parties from 
participating in Kenyan politics.48  Although a number of factors could be attributed to this 
particular measure of  the KANU government, the need to muzzle and prevent opposition 
parties and other political actors from springing up was visible.49  Massime and Kibara believe 
opposition and civil society organisation had a false notion that pluralism would naturally lead 
to democracy and constitutionalism.50  
The constitutional history of Kenya was at stake again in 1988 when President Daniel Arap Moi 
abolished the secret ballot and introduced queue voting. This was happening at a background of 
fear for repression among the population and opposition politicians.51 This was a defining 
moment in Kenya‘s quest for democracy since the population could not freely participate in 
governance issues of the day because of the fear perpetrated by the regime in power.From the 
period of 1964-1990, thirty amendments were made to the constitution and the net effect was 
the legitimisation of the dictatorship and denial of the opposition to participate in government. 
52  
 
The rising opposition from the academia, civil society groups and internal political party dissent 
from those who had been sidelined engaged the regime. President Daniel Arap Moi and the 
KANU party could not stand the political pressure and international criticism.53 In December 
1991, international pressure, coupled with domestic agitation to free the political space, saw 
President Arap Moi succumb to the wishes of the people and a new era of multiparty politics 
began in Kenya.54 
                                                 
48  Kibara  (n 36   above) 2. 
49 Abdirizak (n 1 above) 1. 
50  K Massime & G  Kibara  Kenya’ constitutional evolution (1895-2001) (2001)18. 
51  Matua (n 33  above) 67. 
52  Abdirizak (n 1 above) 1. 
53   D Throup &  C Hornsby   Multi-Party politics In Kenya: The Kenyatta &  Moi States & the Triumph of the 
System in the 1992 Election (1998) 2  
54   Throup &   Hornsby (n 64 above) 2. 
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2.4. Kenya under multipartism (1993- 2002) 
In 1991 Section 2A of the Constitution was repealed and that paved the way for multiparty 
politics.55 The return to multiparty politics was welcomed by the international donors 
community and internal political opposition.56 The introduction of multiparty politics saw, 
among others, the removal of the responsibility of elections to a newly constituted Electoral 
Commission, the restriction of the tenure of the President to two five years terms and the 
restoration of the security of the tenure of the High Court and Court of Appeal Judges, among 
others.57 
The 1992 general elections, the first after the restoration of multiparty system, were won by the 
incumbent President Arap Moi despite claims of irregularities and lack of transparency.58  The 
opposition parties and civil society organisations teamed up to form the National Conventional 
Assembly whose executive organ was the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC).59 
They were convinced that regime change was not possible without constitutional reforms.60  A 
group of parliamentary political parties, including those that had agitated for the formation of 
the NCEC, known as the Inter-party Parliamentary Group,61 agitated for  reforms that were 
geared towards levelling the ground for political parties to participate in the 1997 general 
elections. 62 
After the 1997 elections, an act of parliament was passed providing for the setting up of a 
commission to comprehensively review the constitution.  The emerging opposition and the 
pressure from civil society organisation led President Moi to assent to the formation of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) that would spear head the process of 
                                                 
55  E Nowrejee ‘Kenya: Political pluralism, government resistance and the United States responses’  
Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 5 (1992) 149. 
56  Norwrejee   (n 56 above) 149. 
57  S Schmidt & G Kibara Kenya on the path toward democracy?  An Interim   Evaluation: A qualitative 
assessment of political development in Kenya between 1990 and June 2002, (2002) 14. 
58  See Mutua (n 33  above) 86. 
59  Abdirizak (n 1 above) 3. 
60  W Mutunga Constitution making from the middle: Civil society and transition politics in Kenya (1999) 
112. 
61   Kindiki (n 1 above) 153. 
62  Abdizirak (n 1 above) 7. 
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constitutional amendments.63  This did not ease the process as a pressure group formed by the 
religious leaders called Ufungamano formed the NGO people’s Commission of Kenya to draft a 
new Constitution.64  The Kenyan people thought that Kenya was finally going to be blessed with 
a constitution that was people driven.65  
The CKRC was, however, vulnerable to the executive and the National Assembly because of the 
influence and meddling by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), which was made up of 
members of parliament charged with the constitutional review process.66  The President 
appointed the chair of the CKRC and its commissioners. The impartiality and transparency of 
the CKRC was compromised since they had to work according to the tunes of the regime. Since 
they were nominated by the president, they remained accountable to him rather than to the 
people.  The people were not involved and this denied the people of Kenya the opportunity to 
participate in the process of constitutional making.67   
While KANU and its ruling partners argued for a parliamentary review process, the 
Ufungamano Initiative pushed for a people driven, an all inclusive and participatory process. 
The two divergent positions were later reconciled and a compromise was reached that saw the 
adoption of a parliamentary review and the participatory process by the Ufungamano through 
the 2001 Constitution of Kenya Review Act.68 After a period of protracted political struggle and 
differences regarding the process of constitution making, President Moi, using his powers under 
the Constitution of Kenya, dissolved Parliament and this brought an end to the constitutional 
review process as Kenyans headed to elections in 2002.69 The opposition parties had learnt 
some lessons from the previous elections and, sensing a defeat, teamed up to form the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) that eventually triumphed over the giant KANU regime on 27 
December 2002.  
The various attempts to review the Constitution of Kenya were unsuccessful in so far the 
participation of the public is concerned and the process remained elite driven. The opposition 
could not push for constitutional reforms and a people driven constitution making process 
                                                 
63   Mutua (n 33  above) 118. 
64  Mutua (n 33 above) 112. 
65   Mutua (n 33  above)   113. 
66  Mutua (n 33   above) 125. 
67  Mutua (n 33  above) 125. 
68  Abdirizak   (n 1 above) 3. 
69  SN Ndegwa ‘The Incomplete transition: The constitutional and electoral context in Kenya’   (1998) 45   
Africa Today   197. 
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because the KANU government needed to protect its regime by keeping the people out of the 
participatory processes. The victory by the coalition parties that brought President Mwai 
Kibaki70 to power was regarded by many as an opportunity to have a new constitution in place. 
 
2.5. The Kibaki Era: The promise of a new constitution (2002 -to the 
present) 
NARC had campaigned for reformist tendencies and a return to constitutional order. When the 
Kibaki government came to power in 2002, it promised the people of Kenya a constitution 
within 100 days of its inauguration.71 The national leaders of NaRC signed an agreement with 
religious leaders to effect constitutional reforms.72  The coalition partners had agreed on power-
sharing that gave the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) the presidency while the 
premiership was reserved for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).73  The power sharing deals 
are important. Once the political players are not satisfied with the outcome of the deal, then the 
efforts of the people to come up with a constitution are frustrated by the politicians whose 
interests have not been served, leading to the politicisation of the constitution making process.  
 
2.5.1. The National Constitutional Conference (the Bomas) 
As soon as they assumed power, differences emerged over the composition and roles of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC)74, the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) 
on constitutional review75 and the National Constitutional Conference (NCC).76  Differences on 
the composition of the delegates and regional representation threatened to derail the process 
                                                 
70  President Mwai Kibaki was elected third president of Kenya and KANU‘s long standing reign came to 
end. The coalition parties had agreed on a power sharing deal.  
71  Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) Constitutional review and reform; and adherence to 
the democratic principles in constitutions in southern African countries (2007) 9. 
72   Abdirizak (n 1 above) 4. 
73  Mutua   (n 33 above) 151. 
74  This was a commission set up to spearhead the constitutional review process. 
75  A Committee made up of members of parliament to deal with the constitutional review process. This is 
one of the parliamentary committees. 
76  Mutua (n 33 above) 151. This would be a composition of all groups and people representative in the 
constitution making process. 
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and frustrate the opportunity for the NCC to have a constitution drafted.   The first conventional 
conference meeting, known as the Bomas I, deemed to fail as it collected only views of the 
delegates just as the previous Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) had done 
under President Daniel Arap Moi.77 The second conference, known as the Bomas II, which was 
held in late September 2003, created technical working groups that would report to the 
plenary.78 The working groups again become battle grounds for the various factions similar to 
what had occurred to the previous CKRC under the Moi regime without inclusively involving the 
people.  The last conference, known as Bomas III of March 2004,   was more contentious as the 
LDP-KANU majority voted the Draft Constitution while the other parties walked out of the 
conference.79 The failure of the parties to agree to a common draft showed the weakness and 
institutional problems that affected Kenyan moment of having a constitution. 
 The Kibaki government delayed the key reforms included in the draft that emerged from the 
National Constitutional Conference, such as the reduction of presidential powers, the creation of 
a new post of a prime minister, parliamentary oversight of the central government, land rights 
and judicial independence.  The government finally put the  draft   to a national vote in 2005 
and Raila Odinga, leader of  Orange Democratic Movement(ODM)  and those opposed to the 
draft, won an easy victory as the draft was rejected by the people of Kenya.  Kenya‘s struggle for 
constitutional reform was back to square one and it went to the 2007 election without 
constitutional reform.80   
Although many have hailed the Bomas draft as inclusive and participatory, Muli believes that 
many Kenyans do not know the provisions of the Bomas draft.81  A meaningful participation can 
only be ensured if the people are sensitized and are aware of the process and the content. The 
legitimacy of a constitutional process and the constitution itself should be measured on how the 
process has been participatory, inclusive and democratic.82  
                                                 
77   Mutua (n 33  above) 151. 
78  Mutua (n 33  above) 151. 
79  Kindiki (n 33  above) 154. 
80  Mutua (n 33  above) 159. 
81    Muli (n 31 above) 3. 
82   P R William The Constitution Making Process (2006) 1. 
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2.6. The   post election violence and the Coalition Government. 
 The   2007 Kenyan disputed presidential elections claimed more than 1200 lives and displaced 
an estimated 350,000 people.83 The violence came to an end following the signing of an 
agreement that led to the establishment of the coalition government. The Coalition Agreement 
was signed on 28th February 2008 by Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement and 
President Mwai Kibaki for the government and the party of National Unity.84  The most 
important point for the purpose of this research is the process of constitutionalisation of the 
Agreement and the Act by the coalition government. 
While discussing the state of constitutionalism in Kenya today and analysing the current 
constitutional review process, there is need to look at the effect of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act and the constitutionalisation of the Accord.  
The Kenya National and Reconciliation Act had set an agenda and time limit to deal with the 
long term issues including the constitutional review process. The parties agreed that the 
constitution belongs to the people of Kenya and they should be consulted at all stages of the 
process, including the formation of the process itself, the draft, the parliamentary process and 
the final enactment.85  The proceeding section discusses the constitutional review process that is 
currently underway and its legal frame work. 
 
2.7        The Constitution of Kenya review process of 2009 
 2.7.1    Constitutional review as part of the peace pact. 
The constitutional review process in Kenya was among the major items listed during the Kenya 
national reconciliation dialogue that brought together the protagonists to a power sharing 
agreement.  The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Act, which was adopted to address 
the post election violence, has included, among its objective, three specific agenda: the 
immediate cessation of hostilities after the post election violence, the aversion of the 
                                                 
83  See report (n 11 above) 1. 
84  See Agreement signed 14th march 2008 by the coalition partners and Oluyemi   Adenji as session chair 
from the group of eminent persons available at <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/agreements.aspx> 
(accessed 15 September 2009). 
85   See Agreement (n 84  above).  
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humanitarian crisis and the promotion of reconciliation and healing.86Agenda four dealt with 
long term issues like institutional reforms and ensuring a constitutional review process for 
Kenya before the 2012 elections. The question remains on whether the deadline set for the 
coalition government to have a constitution in place can be achieved without necessarily 
neglecting the need for meaningful participation of the people. 
  
2.7.2 The legal framework for the constitution making process. 
2.7.2.1 The Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act and the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Act 2008  
The constitution review process in Kenya was initiated by the Constitution of Kenya 
Amendment Act and the Constitution of Kenya Review Act. The Constitution of Kenya Review 
Act 2008 provides the legal framework for the review process.  It establishes four organs to 
facilitate the review  process and sets out the procedure through which the four organs will work 
to achieve consensus on contentious issues and to be followed by   a referendum in which all 
eligible voters will decide on the proposed constitution. 
 
2.7.2.2   Guiding principles of the review process  
 Sections 4,6,23 and 29 of the Review Act provide for the guiding principles for the review 
process. This is aimed to serve as framework that guides the organs responsible for the review 
process. The guiding principles set out in the Review Act include: 
• Ensuring that national interests prevail over regional or sectoral interests and 
that there should be accountability to the people of Kenya;87  
• The review process should be able to accommodate the diversity of the people 
and to ensure that the people of Kenya have the opportunity to actively, freely 
                                                 
86 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Act available at 
<http://www.dialoguekeenya.org/docs/Project%20context%20and%20summary%20of%20findings.pdf> 
(accessed 15   September 2009). 
87  See section 6(a) (b) The Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008 on the guiding principles 7.  
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and meaningfully participate in generating and debating proposals on a new 
constitution;88  
• The process must be guided by the principles of stewardship and responsible 
management, respect for principles of human rights, equality, affirmative action, 
gender equality and democracy.89 
 
The above principles are aimed at ensuring that the outcome of the process faithfully reflects the 
wishes of the people of Kenya.  
The four organs established by the Review Act include; The Committee of Experts, the 
Parliamentary Select Committee, the National Assembly and the Referendum.90    In addition, 
section 31 of the Review Act provides for a reference group of representatives of interest groups 
to be identified in the Act and will be an integral component of the process.  We shall examine 
the role of the Committee of Experts and the Parliamentary Select Committee in the review 
process. 
 
2.7.2.3   The Committee of Experts  
The Committee of Experts is expected to finalize its work within 12 months.91 The time allocated 
to the Committee of Experts seems to have been set in accordance with the term of office of the 
coalition government and the period of the transition to the elections. The Committee of Experts 
is supposed to have a constitution before Kenya goes to elections.  It seems  that the period was 
set up to see the end of the transition without putting much emphasis on the participation of the 
people and the differences that might take time to be resolved. 92 The failure to agree especially 
by the coalition partners on the form of government and devolution of power might require the 
extension of the set period.  
 
The Committee of Experts (CoE)   is required among other things to: 
                                                 
88   See section 6(c) (d) (i) (n 88 above) 7. 
89            Section (6) (d) (ii) (IV) Kenya Review Act, 2008 8.  
90  See section 5 Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008. 
91  <http://www.coekenya.go.ke/> constitutional Review map (accessed 15 August 2009). 
 92  Committee of Experts should have flexible time frames to accommodate any differences and delays that 
may occur see OSISA (n 71 above) 28.  
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• identify the issues already agreed upon in the existing draft constitutions; 
• identify issues that are contentious and not agreed upon in the existing draft 
Constitutions, 93 
• solicit and receive from the public written memorandum and presentations on 
the contentious issues,94  
• undertake thematic discussions with caucuses, interest groups and other experts 
facilitate civic education in order to stimulate public awareness on constitutional 
issues,95 
• articulate the respective merits and demerits of the proposed options for 
resolving contentious issues,  
• make recommendations to the Parliamentary Select Committee on the resolution 
of contentious issues, and  
• prepare a harmonized draft constitution for presentation to the National 
Assembly and liaise with the Interim Electoral Commission to hold a referendum 
on the Draft Constitution.  
 
The Committee will study the existing draft constitutions and other related material and prepare 
a report on the issues that have been agreed upon as being contentious and those that are not 
contentious.96 The identification of these issues will be prepared with the consultation of the 
public, interest groups and experts on contentious issues and a harmonized Draft Constitution 
will be prepared.97 The harmonized draft constitution will be published and the public will have 
30 days to comment and make suggestions. 
 
The Committee has met various representatives of political parties on what should be included 
as contentious issues. It has already met the 47 representatives of the political parties98 and has 
received submissions from two major parties namely the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and 
                                                 
93            See Section 23 (b) (c) of the Review Act. 
94            See (n 87  above). 
95            See section 30(2) of the Review Act. 
96           Section 23,  Review Act. 
97           ‘The Road to Review of the Constitution of Kenya’ The Standard  18 June 2009 28. 
98            The Standard   (n 97  above) 1. 
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the Party for National Unity (PNU).99 It has identified the following issues as contentious issues:  
the type of government, devolution of power and transitional measures. The 47 registered party 
representatives want the inclusion of equal representation, right to life, Khadi courts, land 
distribution and land ownership among the list of contentious issues.100 T The representatives of 
the parties, especially those dominated by coastal Muslims, have proposed the inclusion of 
Khadi courts101  and the two protagonists’ parties have submitted proposals with different views 
on the structure of government and the devolution of power.102 The issue of land and the rights’ 
of women to inherit land have been ignored by the Committee.103 
The final document that will include the views of the public will then be consolidated and 
presented to the parliamentary select committee for deliberation and consensus building on the 
contentious issues. 
 
2.7.2.4.   The use of draft constitutions 
Section 29 of the Review Act mandates the Committee of Experts to use as reference the records 
of the views that were received from the Kenyans by the dissolved Constitution of Kenya 
Constitutional Review Commission (CKRC), The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
draft submitted to the Bomas Constitutional Conference later known as the (Ghai Draft)104, The 
Constitutional Conference Draft (Bomas Draft) and the proposed new Constitution 2005(Wako 
Draft).105 Both the Bomas and the Wako draft were rejected and a question remains whether the 
decision to consider using drafts rejected by the people of Kenya would not jeopardize the 
legitimacy of the process. The committee of experts is supposed to ensure a people driven 
                                                 
99          ‘Bomas ghost threatens to scuffle review’  Sunday Nation 21st May   2009 1. 
100         ‘The Coast not yet clear for Law Review Team’ The Standard 09 June 2009 1. 
101           ‘Committee of Experts over looked key issues in the review’ The Standard 6 September 2009 1, See also in the 
same paper the Comments by the Sheikh Sharrif Hussein the organizing Secretary of the Supreme Council of 
Kenya Muslims, 2. 
102   The Standard (n 1o1 above) 1. 
103           The Standard (n 1o1 above) 2. 
104  Yash Ghai is an expert on Constitutional law that once chaired the Constitutional Review Process but 
later resigned citing interference from the government. 
105  Wako was the state attorney general and the draft was named after him. 
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process. As it has been demonstrated in the past, if the legislature or parliament decides matters 
without the approval and participation of the people, the process will be challenged. 106  
 
2.7.2.5   The Parliamentary Select Committee. 
The Review Act requires that the Parliamentary Select Committee reaches a consensus on draft 
constitution. The Committee of Experts will revise the draft constitution in accordance with the 
consensus achieved by the Parliamentary Select Committee. The select committee will then table 
the draft constitution before the National Assembly which may approve the draft without 
amendments or propose amendments.107 
In situations where the National Assembly approves the draft constitution, it will submit it 
immediately to the Attorney General for preparation of a referendum. If amendments have been 
proposed, the Committee of Experts must revise the draft and resubmit it again to the Assembly. 
It becomes more problematic in situation where the National Assembly does not reach 
agreement and this will necessitate the Committee of Experts, the Parliamentary Select 
Committee and the reference groups to meet and discuss the problematic issues. However, this 
process is limited by time and may take more than 7 days that have been scheduled.108 The 
National Assembly must approve the final draft with in 14 days and submit it to the Attorney 
General for publication.109 The  
 
2.7.2.6 Conclusion  
The Constitution making process in Kenya is underway and it should be completed within 100 
days. The Committee of Experts have identified  the contentious issues as including devolution 
of power and structure of government,  on whether it will be Parliamentary or a hybrid 
system.110 The central question remains whether the ordinary citizens have played meaningful 
                                                 
106  See Njoya and others v Attorney and others [2004] LLR 4788 (HCK). The Njoya and others   brought by 
the applicants on 17th February 2004 shows how the citizens of Kenya have used Courts to challenge 
process that denies the people the right to participate.  
107  The Standard  (n 97  above) 28. 
108  The Standard ( 97  above) 28. 
109  The Standard ( 97   above) 28. 
110  <http://kenyaun.org/documents/contentiousissues.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2009) 1-3. 
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role in deciding the contentious issues and whether the Committee of Experts has consulted the 
various communities and sections of people in Kenya. 
In order to ensure meaningful participation and bring in a constitution that enjoys legitimacy, 
there are some normative and basic principles of constitutional making that should be adhered 
to. The next chapter explores the contextual understanding of meaningful participation in a 
constitutional making process 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NORMATIVE STANDARDS AND THE CONCEPT OF 
PUBLICPARTICIPATION 
3.0. Introduction 
 An examination of Kenya‘s road to constitution making begs the question whether there are 
normative guidelines against which constitution making in Kenya can be judged. There are no 
universally accepted norms and standards that apply to constitution making. Different 
modalities and methods of constitution making have been adopted by different countries. The 
starting point for any constitutional system is necessarily a political fact and the process is a 
political decision that aims at addressing a political and sociological fact often known as the 
Grundnorm.111 Kelsen has argued that the Grundnorm determines the process and the 
content.112 There seems to be a consensus that people are the custodians of democracy and 
should be involved at all stages of constitution making. The process must empower the people 
rather than inhibit them by creating opportunities and avenues for individual effective 
participation.113 A Zimbabwean High Court judge, Ben Hlatswayo, succinctly summarized the 
point by emphasising that ‘modern ideas on constitution making place emphasis on popular 
participation and wide spread consultation in order to produce a constitution and which the 
people feel is truly their own’.114 This says that citizen’s level of involvement in the process of 
constitution making determines the legitimacy of the process. There is also need to ensure the 
involvement of civil society organisations.115 
By making reference to relevant literature and various international legal instruments, this 
chapter outlines some of the normative standards that apply to constitution making. Whenever 
relevant, it seeks to illustrate the norms by making reference to the experience of other 
countries.  
                                                 
111   The Grund-norm is like the prior Constitutional question that needs to be answered. It is like the 
foundation and the basis of the constitution process and substance. 
112   E McWhinney Constitution- making: principles, process and practice (1981) 12. 
113  S Mwale Constitution review: The Zambian search for an ideal constitution making, paper presented at 
the 10th African Forum for Catholic social teaching (AFCAST) working group meeting, 02 may 2006, 
Nairobi Kenya 2. 
114  I Mawire  Democratisation and constitutionalism through constitution-making process 
inzimbabwe<http://zimpolitic.blogspot.com/2009/07/democratisation-and-constitutionalism.html> 
(accessed 9 July 2009). 
115   M Hansungule Experiences at Constitution-making in SADC: The Zambian experience (2004) 28. 
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 1. Normative standards for constitution making  
1.1. Effective Participation: The right of rights. 
The notion of public participation has not been fully defined. It is, however, a concept that is 
widely recognised by both international and regional legal instruments. Participation purports 
the legitimation of a new political order by creating a link between the framers of the 
constitution and the public.116 The right to constitution making is derived from the right to 
‘democratic participation’ as provided under the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.  
Article 21 of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights recognises the concept of public 
participation as ‘democratic participation’ where as Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights provides for every citizen’s rights to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs.117 Article 13 (1) of the African Charter provides for public participation.118  The content of 
public participation119 has been expanded and developed to include other rights like political 
equality, freedom of speech and association.120 In the context of constitution making, public 
participation has been viewed to include openness throughout the constitution making process, 
access to information and shared responsibilities between the government and the civil 
society.121    
Effective public participation implies the involvement of the public at all stages of the 
constitution making including in the selection of members of the review process. The process of 
constitution making can only claim legitimacy and credibility if the people have been 
meaningfully involved in each stage of the process. There is need to involve the people at all 
levels whether in a constituent assembly or through a referendum.122  In some cases. the role of 
the public is limited to providing input in the drafting of the constitution and in the final 
                                                 
116 G Hyden & D  Venter  Constitution-making and democratization in Africa (2001) 20. 
117  V Hart Democratic constitution making: (2003) 5 available at <http//www.usip.org> (accessed 20 October 
2009). See also United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment on Article 25 of the ICCPR, 12 
July 1996 about citizen participation of public affairs especially in choosing and changing their constitution.  
118
       C Heyns   & M Killander (eds)   Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union (2007) 32. 
119       S De Villers    A people’ s government. The people’s voice (2001) 159. 
120       V Hart (n 117  above) 6. See the right to participation and the accompanying ‘penumbra rights’.  
121       De Villiers (n 119  above) 159. 
122  M Thiankolu The Constitutional review cases: emerging jurisprudence (2006) available at 
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads_Other/thiankolu_landmarks.pdf >  (accessed 8 August 2009) The 
Kenyan Courts have in the Njoya case implicitly mentioned the ‘constituent power’ of the people being the 
constituent assembly and a compulsory referendum. 
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decision making process of voting through referendum.123 Often, the public is not informed 
about the key individual players including the review commissioners and experts although the 
selection of the commissioners and experts marks the formal beginning of the process.  
Issues like how and when the people should be involved in constitution making process have 
been a subject of debate. 124  In constitution making, public participation can come in different 
forms namely a constituent assembly, public meetings and a referendum.125 Public participation 
can also be conducted in various ways, such as using the media and organising public meetings, 
depending on the available resources and the geographical area of coverage.126 This is not always 
an easy task. The South African constitution making process demonstrates the difficulty of 
engaging in effective dialogue with a wide population of 4o million people in a constitution 
making process.127 The people should decide whether the process should be carried out by a 
general convention gathering, target groups or visiting each constituency in order to get their 
views on the process and content.128  Effective participation also implies that each community, 
including minorities and the disadvantaged should be consulted.129 The quality of the process is 
determined by ensuring the participation of all those who have views and grievances which 
makes participation genuine and not a charade.130 
 
1.2 Consultation on the process and the content 
The process of constitution making should be guided by consultation which yields to 
accountability.131 The consultation process should be transparent and inclusive. 132   The South 
African Constituent Assembly pursued consultation based on the fundamental components of 
political representation, organized formations outside parliament and individual citizens.133 The 
                                                 
123   Y Ghai, The Constitution reform process: Comparative perspectives ‘towards inclusive and participatory 
constitution making’ 3-5 August, 2004 Kathmandu, Nagarkot 7. 
124       Mc Whinney (n 112  above) 27. 
125       Mc Whinney (n 112  above) 27.  
126        H Ebrahim   The Soul of Nation: Constitution making in South Africa (1998) 242. 
127        Ebrahim (n 126  above) 241. 
128        De Villiers  (n 119  above) 159. 
129  V Hart (n 117  above) 9. 
130         V Hart (n 117  above) 9. 
131   S Skjelton Public participation in the South Afriacn constitution making ( 2006) 43. 
132  Skjelton (n 131 above) 51. 
133  Skjelton (n 131  above) 40. 
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South African  process aimed at not only ensuring that  people are part of the process but also 
that the process had to be seen transparent and open. Consultation empowers the people since 
they are able to make effective contributions and submissions, indicating what they want to be 
included in the constitution.134 
 The people as the custodians of the constitution should be involved in identifying the 
contentious issues and setting up the agenda for the constitution review commissions. Empirical 
evidence regarding the process of constitution making indicates that the process itself is not 
decisive without considering its prior creation and adoption.135  In situations where the people 
are not consulted in determining the contentious issues and challenging the credibility of the 
commissioners, the process risks legitimacy. 136  Mavuto indicates that the Malawian 
constitution making process lacked legitimacy as the process was dominated by the local and 
international experts. 137  Further more, none of the members of the National Constitution 
Commission held office by virtue of elections or had any direct mandate from the people. 138  As 
a result, the Malawian constitution making process reflected the views of international experts 
who were influenced by western donors; it is thus no wonder that it was considered one of the 
world’s most liberal constitutions.139  The lesson is that the choice of members of the 
commission and the process to be employed should not be reserved only to the political parties 
and the executive.  The process of consultation should not be limited to the residents of urban 
areas but should be also extended to rural population.   The process must also be inclusive so as 
to cater for the various interests of the different groups in society, otherwise the process might 
end up being an elite driven process rather than a people driven process.  
 
                                                 
134            H Ebrahim (n 126  above) 241. 
135  A Sajo Constitution with out constitutional moment: A view from the new member states (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional law 243. 
136  Mavuto (n 22 above) 15. 
137  Mavuto (n 22  above) 14. 
138   J Banda ‘The Constitutional change debate of 1993-1995(1998) quoted by HH Mavuto popular 
participation in constitution making: The experience of Malawi (2007) 15. 
139  FE  Kanyongolo ‘the limits of liberal democratic constitutionalism in Malawi’ in K M Phiri & K R Ross  
Democratisation in Malawi  in  HH Mavuto Popular participation in constitution making : The Malawian 
experience ( 2007) 16. 
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1.3 Inclusiveness of the process 
1.3.1   The role of civil society organisations. 
Civil society organisations have been recognised as an important force in constitution making 
process. 140  Members of the civil society, both registered and unregistered, should be allowed to 
present their views both on the content and the process of constitution making. The South 
African constitution making process demonstrated the important role of the civil society in 
constitution making. The submissions by gender activists groups and other civil society 
organisations clearly had an impact on the constitution making process.141 The South African 
experiences shows that civil society organisations were successful when they worked together on 
issues, especially lobbying for a comprehensive bill of rights in the constitution.142  Civil society 
organisations in South Africa, such as the Legal Resource Centre and the National Association of 
Democratic Lawyers provided submissions for the inclusion of socio economic rights in the 
constitution.143   
 During the South African constitution making process, members of the civil society took 
ownership of the process by contributing substantially to the process and carried out and 
disseminated information about constitution making to the members of their organisations.144 
Ebrahim has noted that, since the South African constituent assembly could not reach more 
than 40 million people, the strategy of reaching the ‘people who reach the people’ worked out 
better and had an impact on the constitution making process.145  
It has been argued that since most African societies are divided along ethnic lines, initiatives 
from civil society groups will address divisions.  This is especially true of civil society 
organisations that are representative of groups, tribes and ethnicities. The capacity of these civil 
society organisations to listen and represent their people is drawn from Bratton‘s argument that 
ethnic heterogeneity in leadership and staffing is as relevant to maintaining legitimacy in civic 
                                                 
140   Hansungule (n 115  above ) 29. 
141            De Villiers (119  above ) 134.  
142           See ‘ the cooperation of the  Black Sash and the National  Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights’   in De Villiers 
(n 119  above) 134. 
143  De Villiers (n 1 19  above)    135.  
144   De Villiers (n 119 above) 104. 
145    De Villiers (n 119 above) 104. 
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organisations as in the African state.146 The civil society organisations that are capable of 
representing the people are those that have are ethnically based and structured  
1.3.2 The role of religious leaders  
The right to religion and belief is enshrined in most international human rights documents.   
Each religious group ought to be represented and their views need to be taken into 
consideration.  Religion plays an important role in society ‘s organisation and functioning. The 
constitution  making process ought to include the various religious leaders and faith groups so 
as to achieve an inclusive constitution.  
 
1.3.3 The role of women  
Constitution making ought to be inclusive and must protect all especially vulnerable members of 
the community.  In most African patriarchal societies where women have limited or no rights, 
constitution making is an opportunity to address gender inequality. Women participation in the 
constitution making process is also very important for fostering democracy and human rights. 
Women associations, both rural and urban, should be involved in the consultation phase. In 
South Africa, 
 
[w]omen played an important role in the… constitution making process….were able to bring 
shared experiences and perspectives, across party lines. More important women were able to act 
in a united way in respect of gender-related issues like treatment of rural women under 
customary law. These issues were later resolved in favour of equality of women.147 
 
The South African experience of involving women had been adopted by the Afghanistan   
constitution making process that took place in 2003 although the treatment of women differ in 
                                                 
146  G R Murunga ‘Review essay civil society and democratic experience in Kenya: A review of constitution 
making from the middle: Civil society and transition politics in Kenya, 1992-1997’ (2000) 4   African 
Sociological Review   97. 
 
147
       De Villiers (n 119 above) 13. See also IDEA report on the South African constitution making process and the 
role of women (2000) 37-8. 
 
 
 
 
 27 
the two societies, especially  with regard to culture and religion.148  The Rwandan process of 
constitution making provides more practical examples of a post conflict society, where network 
organisations through out the country mobilised a multifaceted campaign to address gender 
equality in the constitution making process.149  In Rwanda, women organisations organised 
consultative forums aimed at encouraging women to participate in the constitution making 
process.150  The empowerment and involvement of women in the constitution making process is 
a paramount factor in ensuring inclusiveness.   
 
1.3.4  Minorities and marginalised 
The process of constitution making should put into account the concerns of minorities and the 
marginalised. The minorities could be tribal, religious or other divides depending on a particular 
society. The disadvantaged include all those who have been exploited by the political, economic 
and social structures.151 In any process of decision making, equal rights and justice should be of 
primary consideration.152 The exclusion of minorities from the process of constitution making 
affects the democratic character of the process. As noted by Osisa,  
  
 ...if an elite group determines the fundamental rights which are essential component of 
democracy they face the charge of being undemocratic. If it is left to the majority to determine 
these rights, the majority, in its own interest, exclude a norm, such as that of equality, which 
by some international standards is regarded as an essential component of democracy.153  
                                                 
                  148 De Villiers (n 119 above) 13. The Afghanistan constitution making process was characterized by intimidation, 
threats and harassment of women. The Afghanistan society is mainly Islamic with strict Islamic laws that 
hinder women‘s right to association and movement. 
149    AM Banks ‘Challenging political boundaries in post conflict societies’ (2007) 29 University of Pennsylvania  
Journal of International Law   105. 
150     Banks (n 149  above) 150. 
151  B Knight et al; Reviving democracy: citizens at the heart of governance (2002) 76. 
152    Knight (n 151  above) 76. 
153  Osisa (n 71  above) 27. 
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1.4 Control of the agenda  
Constitutional law expert Vivien Hart suggests that the people should be involved in all stages 
including the pre, during and post phases of the drafting of a constitution.154  The constitution 
making process should be controlled and owned by the people who form the ‘constituent power’.  
McWhinney weighs the role of the technicians and the people to whom he refers to as the 
general community.155 He is of the view that even if both are needed, the people need to have 
greater role on what should be included in the Constitution.156    
 
The question of control of the agenda arises in especially situations of power sharing where the 
constitution becomes a negotiated instrument among  political players. In both South Africa and 
Rwanda, the elites framed the campaigns and provided personnel to the constitution making 
process but gave room for the public to effectively participate in the process by receiving 
submissions and visiting the rural communities.157  
In some situations Parliament and political parties drive the process and the people are often 
neglected throughout the process. There have been controversial debates on the repository of 
the sovereign power since even constituent assemblies are representatives of the people.158  The 
people ought to participate through a structured process at all stages and the parliament should 
not determine the process. There were instances where the people have clearly rejected the role 
of parliament to control the agenda of constitution making.159  Political struggles and infighting 
within the various political parties in parliament may usurp the process from being a people 
driven process to a parliamentary driven process. This renders the people’s participation 
marginal as the process becomes politicised.  The element of ownership leading to legitimacy 
can only be effective in case there has been enough civic education and understanding by the 
public. The participation can only be effective when the public understands the process as well 
as the content.  
                                                 
154  Osisa (n 71  above) 7. 
155  Mac Whinney (n 112  above) 26. 
156  Mac Whinney   (n 112  above) 26. 
157            De Villiers (119  above ) 13. 
158   Thiankolu ( n 117 above ) 17. 
159  Mul1 (n 31 above) 3. 
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1.5. The level of civic education and awareness campaigns 
The process of constitution making must empower the people through civic education 
programmes.  The population must be educated about the role they are supposed to play in the 
process of constitution making. The people must be informed about the constitutional 
framework and the possible considerations available to them in forming the constitution.160  The 
Rwandan and South African constitution making processes have been hailed for the levels of 
education campaign they conducted both in the rural and urban communities.161  
 The South African experience of constitution making provides a good example on the role of a 
civic education programme that target grassroots.162 The South African Constituent Assembly  
decided to run an extensive constitution education programme before seeking for public 
submissions. It has been noted that constitutional education is not only important for quality 
submissions but it also creates awareness in the community.163 The public education 
programmes help in situations where the process is politicised and the people are inclined to 
vote for parties and leaders instead of the document.164  
 
Civic education programmes should target all groups of people including women, the 
marginalised and disadvantaged communities. Civic education can take various forms including 
disseminating information in public gatherings, workshops and the media. It should also 
include visiting constituencies since the majority of the people can not access  newspapers, radio 
and television. In the case of South Africa, skjelten notes that, 
  
Due to the fact that a significant proportion of South African population, often illiterate or 
semi illiterate was unable to access information about the constitution- making process, either 
                                                 
160  S Brooke ‘Constitutional-making and immutable principles (2005) in HH Mavuto Popular participation 
in constitution making: The Malawian experience (2007) 3. 
161  Osisa (n 71 above) 30. 
162  Skjelten (n 131 above) 77. 
163  Skjelten (n 131 above) 77. 
164  Some politicians who think the Document does not favour them will often incite the population to vote 
against it. A clear example is the Kenyan Constitution making process popularly known as the Bomas 
Draft which despite the fact that some people think it was inclusive and participatory was rejected due to 
the political battles among the party leaders. 
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in print media or television, the need for constitutional education about the public 
participation programme was crucial.165   
 
The provision of information is one of the basic elements of rule making as the beneficiaries are 
aware of their role in the process of rule making.166 The people should be provided the necessary 
tools, making it possible for them to make effective contributions to the debate. A constitutional 
making process need workshops, seminars, public meetings and people that are trained and 
knowledgeable about the process and the constitutional issues involved. In some countries, local 
offices are established all over the country to provide an access point to equip the people with 
relevant information pertaining to the constitution.167  In particular, this should be the case with 
the disadvantaged and marginalized.168   
 
1.6. Credibility and competence of the reviewing organ  
The organs tasked to carry out the review process must enjoy a sense of credibility in the 
process.169 The commissioners and experts must be trustworthy, reliable, competent and 
persons of integrity. The organs of the review process must be de-linked from the political 
struggles of those in power and be able to serve the interest of the people who are the custodians 
of the process. The credibility and competence of the organs, commissioners and experts has an 
impact on the out come of the process. The commissioners and experts should work towards 
implementing the wishes of the people than safeguarding the interests of the various political 
players in government. The credibility and competence of organs, commissioners and experts 
has an impact on the outcome pf the process.   
Since independence it has been a practice for many African countries to adopt constitutions 
through the use of commissions and experts.170 These commissions and committees of experts 
have come under criticism for failing to produce durable and long lasting constitutions.171  The 
                                                 
165   Skjelten (n 131 above) 76. 
166            CM Kerwin, Rule making: How government agencies write law and make policy (2003) 52. 
167   See Osisa (n 71  above) 29. 
168  H Ebrahim ‘Constitution making in southern Africa-challenges to for the millennium’ (2002) in HH 
Mavuto Popular Participation in Constitution Making: The Malawian experience (2007) 3. 
169
             Ndulo ( n 21 above) 114. 
170   Ndulo (n 21  above) 114. 
171   Ndulo (n 21  above) 114. 
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commissions and committees have always been susceptible to manipulation by those in power 
who have often imposed their own constitutional order.172 The Zambian experience of the draft 
Constitution of 1996 demonstrates how constitutional making by the Commissions can be 
influenced by the government in power for their own interests and commissioners being divided 
along the different power struggles.173 The selection and final appointment of the commissioners 
should be credible and impartial so as to gain legitimacy and confidence from the public who are 
the custodians of the constitution. The danger of constitutional elitism surfaces in cases where 
those engaged in the constitution making process are well known politicians with vested 
interests.174 Sajo describes the authenticity of a constitution as  a product of the personal 
credibility of individuals who are not influenced by socially acceptable interests and whose 
personal integrity is respected in the community.175 
 
1.7. Political will 
Constitution making is also a political process. The people in position of power will ensure a 
process and machinery that protects their interests. The opposition parties will see this as an 
opportunity to change the government. In power sharing governments, the question seems to be 
more complex as there is always no consensus on leadership and policy issues.  It has been 
argued that governments, aware of the politics involved in constitution making, have often 
shaped the choice and process of constitution making with the view  to protect their interests.176 
The Eritrean and the Kenya previous Bomas conference are constitutional making process 
which fulfilled most of the requirements of participatory democracy but were brought down by 
leaders.177 It has been suggested that the political leadership needs to be an honest broker 
throughout the whole process with the spirit of nation building.178 It is believed that ‘Society will 
not attribute legitimacy to the constitution if the leadership is seen corrupt or having mala 
fides.’179  Political will remains one of the fundamental and underlying foundations of achieving 
a constitution order.  
                                                 
172   Ndulo (n 21   above) 114 
173    Ndulo ( n 21   above) 114 
174   Sajo ( n 135  above) 16. 
175   Sajo ( n 135  above ) 16 
176  Whinney (n 112  above) 27. 
177  Osisa (n 71  above) 25. 
178  Osisa (n 71  above) 26. 
179  Osisa (n  71  above) 26. 
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1.8   Timing  
In constitution making, the time allocated for each stage and phase matters.180 The problem is 
that in most countries, constitution making process set the foundation in post conflict countries 
for incoming elections.181 This leads the drafters and the organs to work under time constraints, 
some times even omitting important information that would have been received from the pubic.  
It is also more problematic when the constitution making process is happening immediately 
after or before a political moment in country‘s history.182 In countries that are preparing for 
election, it would be difficult to identify the genuine interests of the various groups and parties 
as some of contributions will be based on partisan politics and power. Ebrahim provides the 
difficulty of timing in South Africa as the constitution making process happened after what he 
describes as a ‘’ liberation election’.  It was difficult for the ordinary south African citizens to 
distinguish the process and the government‘s delivery of services.   
More important are the time frames allocated for the constitution making process and how they 
impact the outcome. The South African constitution making process took six years owing to the 
history of apartheid and the prolonged dialogue between the stake holders.183 The Nigerian 
Debate Coordinating Committee in Nigeria was given two months and this was criticised as 
minimal and impugned upon the quality of the content. 184 If the time allocated to the organs 
and a commission charged with constitution making is minimal, it will have an impact on the 
outcome of the process. An effective constitution making process should allocate sufficient time 
to each stages of constitution making process to allow effective, professional and efficient 
process.185  
                                                 
180
  H Ebrahim (n 12 6  above) 240. 
181  In South Africa, they needed a constitution before going to elections in 1994. The Kenyan constitutional 
review commission must complete its work in 12 months before Kenya goes to elections. 
182   H Ebrahim (n 126   above) 241. 
183   Osisa ( n 71  above ) 25. 
184  Osisa ( n 71  above) 25. 
185  Osisa ( n 71  above ) 25 
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1.9 The referendum  
The constitution making process sometimes ends with the people deciding through a 
referendum. A referendum is a mechanism which provides an opportunity to the people to 
decide on a particular issue or decision made by a governmental body.186  In constitutional 
making, the referendum will be the endorsement of the people to the constitution by the people.  
 
The process of how a referendum is organized is as important as the out come of a referendum. 
The public should be educated about the referendum politics. In some situations, this becomes 
an opportunity for those who are not satisfied with the process to hinder the constitution 
making process. The people must be educated and knowledgeable about the referendum process 
and how it is conducted. The people should be aware of what they are approving and 
disapproving through a referendum. The choice of the terminology of what to vote for in a 
referendum is as important as the contents of the referendum. The referendum organizing body 
should determine what people are voting for and against other than the referendum being an 
extension of political scuffles and fights. Referendums should be seen as making decisions on 
laws that will affect policy and decisions not voting for political parties in power. 
 
1.10 Conclusion  
Modern Constitution making has introduced normative principles and paradigms under which 
the process should take place. In order to have legitimacy, the process of constitution making 
should satisfy certain requirements. The people should be able to understand the importance of 
the constitution and should have knowledge of both the process and the content. The role of 
political parties is necessary but should not be given prominence over the people who are the 
custodians of the constitution as political parties often pursue partisan interests.187 The role of 
experts should also be recognized but they should only play an advisory role and they can not 
replace the role of the public in the drafting process.188 Experience from various countries has 
shown how the process of constitution making reveals a pattern of actors, including political 
                                                 
186  M Suksi  Bringing in the people; A comparison of constitutional forms and practices of the referendum 
(1993) 6. 
187  Mavuto ( n 22 above) 4. 
188  Mavuto  (n 22  above) 4. 
 
 
 
 
 34 
parties and donors.189 This influence on the constitution making process by donor countries 
affects public participation since the views of the donors are given importance.  
 
Referendums have been highly politicized without considering the process, time and resources 
at the expense of party politics. Even process that people have effectively participated in 
contributing to the making of the constitution have been rejected at referendums due to 
politicization by the politicians.   Kenya makes no exception; it has had a difficult experience of 
constitution making and rejections through referendums. The coalition government through the 
Constitution of Kenya review commission has embarked on the process of constitution making. 
The next chapter examines the process under taken in Kenya against the normative standards 
and requirements of constitution making outlined in this chapter 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTION MAKING PROCESS IN 
KENYA 
4.0 Introduction 
The constitution making process, as demonstrated in the preceding chapter, is a legal and 
scientific process that ought to adhere to some basic principles and standards. Kenya is 
currently undergoing a constitution making process. The history of constitution making in 
Kenya has been linked to the search for good governance and democracy.190  The process of 
constitution making should consider the history in order to learn from the past and build the 
future.191. This chapter evaluates the constitution making process in Kenya against the 
background outlined in the preceding chapter and in light of past experiences of constitution 
making in Kenya. The focus is on the role of the people at each stage of constitution making in 
Kenya.  
 
4.1 The principle of effective participation 
As indicated earlier, the basis of a people‘s driven constitution review aims at ensuring people’s 
participation throughout the entire process beginning from the collection of views, to 
determining  contentious issues, building consensus  and other debates related to the 
referendum.  
 
4.1.1. The consultation process 
The process of constitution making creates an opportunity for dialogue with the people through 
consultation.192  The Committee of Experts has embarked on a consultation process that targets 
political parties, reference groups and calls for individual submissions on contentious issues that 
need to be included in the draft constitution.193 The consultation process in Kenya is taking place 
                                                 
190  Muli (n 31 above) 3. 
191  Muli (n 31   above) 4. 
192  K Samuels ‘Post Conflict peace building and constitution- making’ (2006) 2 Chicago Journal of 
International law 663.  
193   The road to the review of the Constitution of Kenya, The Standard   19 June  2009, 28. 
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in a backdrop of suspicion that the Committee of Experts has already drafted the constitution 
and would soon table it before the parliament.194 Article 23(b) and 30(1) (b) of the constitution 
of Kenya Review Act 2008 mandated the committee to identify issues that are contentious and 
not agreed upon in the constitution review process.195 The committee has met and discussed 
with reference groups196 and received submissions from the major political parties on what they 
deem as contentious and not agreed upon. The ordinary Kenyans have been tasked to write 
proposals and send emails to the offices of the committee offices and website, as indicated in the 
advertisement and notices published in the newspapers and posted on the website of the 
committee of experts.197 There is a need to understand the literacy levels in Kenya and the 
accessibility of the internet mainly in the rural areas of Kenya.  
 
After inviting the public and all the political stakeholders to submit proposals on contentious 
issues, the committee identified executive, legislatures, devolution of power and bringing the 
constitution into effect as contentious issues.198  The type of executive government, whether 
parliamentary or a hybrid system and whether there will be one a parliament and a senate is also 
identified as contentious issue. The Kenyan people ought to have played a role in determining 
the reference groups and the people that make up the reference groups. 
 
 4.1.2. The inclusiveness of the process  
4.1.2.1 .The role of civil society oganisations 
The need to empower and involve civil society organisations is fundamental in constitution 
making processes. 199 The civil society in Kenya has proposed to the committee of experts to 
come up with two drafts in which one provides for a presidential system while the other provides 
                                                 
194   ‘Constitutional review hits new turbulence’ The Standard 6 September 2009 1. 
195   <http://www.coekenya.go.ke/images/stories/contentiousissues.pdf> (accessed 8 October 2009). 
196  These are specific target groups representing the various people in Kenya including youth and women. 
197  <http://kenyaun.org/documents/contentiousissues.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2009).  
198   The Standard  (n 1o1  above)2 
199   W Mutunga ‘A Review essay; civil society and democratic experience in Kenya: A review of Constitution 
making from the middle: civil society and transitional politics in Kenya 1992-1997’ (2000) 4   African 
Sociological Review 97.  
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for a parliamentary system and let the people of Kenya decide through referendum.200 The 
Kenyan civil society organizations have constantly echoed the need for an all inclusive process of 
constitution making.201The role of civil society in constitutional engineering is not a new 
phenomenon in Kenya.202 The previous constitution making process known as the Bomas 
conference did involve the civil society organisations in the process of constitution making.203 
However, after the draft Constitution was rejected in 2005, less effort have been employed by 
the civil society organisations in the constitution making process compared to the previous role 
of civil society organisations.  
 
4.1.2.2 The role of religious leaders in the review process 
The role of the religious leaders can not be underestimated in the constitution making process 
since the majority of the population is affiliated to different religious denominations. The 
process is facing a difficult challenge from religious communities with regard to the 
determination of contentious issues and, more specifically, the provision of the Khadi courts204 
in the constitution.205The Khadi courts are recognized by the current constitution of Kenya but 
this has sparked off debates and opposition from the Christian majority206 on the ground that 
Kenya is a secular state and that no religion should be provided for in the constitution.207  The 
Kenyan standard news paper has reported that the refusal by the committee of experts to 
include the Khadi courts was in the interest of the Kenyan people and aimed at avoiding clashes 
between the Christians and the Muslims as stated below; 
                                                 
200  The Standard  (n 99 above) 2. 
201  The civil society has played a vital role in Kenya’s attempts to have a constitution including the 
contributions on the form and substance. 
202  National civil society congress, the constitution review agenda briefing paper to partners and 
collaborators meeting at the finish embassy, September 17 2008, 2. 
203           National Civil Society Congress ( n 201  above) 3.  
204  These are Islamic courts charged with dealing with marriage and divorce matters between the Muslim 
communities.  See the standard, 06 September 2009 on the number of khadi courts in Kenya ‘There are 
currently 17 Khadi Courts in Kenya’ 2. 
205  ‘Committee of experts over looked key issues in review’ The Standard  O6 September 2009. 
206  The Standard ( n 102 above) 1, ‘among those strongly opposed to the Khadi courts being entrenched in 
the new constitution is reverend David Oginde of the church of Kenya’. 
207  The Standard (n 102  above) 1, ‘there is section of Christians who were against it being entrenched in the 
new constitution.  Others came to understand that it has been in the current constitution since 1963 and 
it never harmed anybody. It is only a few who were against it’’ chief khadi sheikh Hammad Kassim. 
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 I do not wish to comment on khadi courts question because doing so will open 
wounds and rivalries between Muslims and Christians. I think the committee of 
experts skipped this matter for a good reason.208 
 
 
The issues involving religion are highly sensitive and emotive as they cut through all the 
tribal and regional divides in Kenya and this calls for a thorough examination of the role of 
religious groups in constitution making.  It has been argued that a constitution has to protect 
the fundamental moral rights of citizens and ensuring the dignity of persons and their moral 
aspirations.209 The different religious groups have not been engaged meaningfully with 
regard to the establishment of Khadi Courts  within the constitution and its implications to 
other religious grouping.  Committee of experts should not ignore such important issues of 
faith.  The churches have promised to boycott the constitution making process in case their 
concerns are not addressed. In a democratic society, all people are free to exercise their own 
religions. However, the opposition from the Christians indicates that committee did not 
consult widely the population on this matter.210 Any possible complaints from other religious 
groups could have been addressed by including all religious denominations in the 
constitution making process.  
 
4.1.2.3   The role of women   
 
I should like to see the time come when women shall help to make the laws. I should like to see 
that whiplash, the ballot, in the hands of women. As for this city’s government, I don’t want to 
say much, except that it is a shame - a shame; but if I should live twenty five years longer - and 
there is no reason why I shouldn’t - I think I’ll see women handle the ballot. If women had the 
ballot today, the state of things in this town would not exist…211.   
                                                 
208   The Standard (n 102 above) 1. 
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          J G Murphy  After word : Constitutionalism, moral skepticism and religious beliefs in  S Rosenbaum 
(ed)  Constitutionalism; The Philosophical dimension (1988) 240 
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         ‘ Church leaders threaten to reject law over Khadi Courts’ Daily Nation  27 October 2009 1 
211  Centre for Rights Education and Awareness Constitution making power dynamics, intrigues and 
struggles: Kenyan women reflect (2003) IV. 
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The above experience in Kenya highlights the role of women in decision making processes and 
the impact of women involvement in nation building.  Women form part of the section in the 
Kenyan society whose rights have been undermined by cultural and religious denominations. 
Women in Kenya have no right to land. Owing to the traditions in Kenya, women do not have 
equal rights to men to inherit land.212 Despite this fact, the committee of experts has not 
included the land issue as a contentious issue thus indirectly failing to address the plight of 
women in Kenya.  
It seems that women are being continuously marginalized from the process of constitution 
making.  Even the Bomas constitutional making process that was credited for its inclusiveness 
has been criticized for not providing women a proper forum to participate.213 The same seems to 
be the case with the current process. The Kenyan constitution making process must give a 
greater role to women in the consultation process so as to respect and protect their rights in the 
constitution. The consultation process should involve women movements and groups both from 
urban and rural parts of Kenya. The Kenyan constitution making process would be upheld 
inclusive if women are given a sufficient role to contribute to the process. 
 
4.1.3 The role minorities and the marginalised groups 
The constitution making process in Kenya should ensure that the voices of the minorities and 
the marginalized are heard. There seems to no universally accepted definition of the term 
minorities.214  Minorities may be sexual, religious, tribal or any grouping according to society‘s 
classification. This research paper will only look at minorities in terms of representation and 
numerical. The disadvantaged are all those that are regarded inferior due to historical, political, 
social and economic reasons. The marginalized are those who can not compete with others 
because of the socio-political situation they endure in their life. Where as minorities may include 
a tribe and an ethnic group, the disadvantaged cut through all the groups in society and may 
                                                 
212  The Standard (n 101 above) 2 states that ‘on the question of land ownership, the thorny issue is the 
proposal that women be accorded equal rights to inherit land. Apparently, this is contrary to the cultural 
practices and beliefs of many Kenyans’’. 
213   Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (n 211  above) 8. 
214  Samuels  ( n 208  above) citing MN Shaw ‘ the definition of minorities in international law.’80 
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include the landless and the internally displaced people.215   There exist minority groups in 
Kenya like the Somali, Samburu, Pokot and other unidentified tribes.216 Ethnic minorities 
happen to occupy the biggest land mass of northern Kenya. A majority of Kenyans do not 
consider these minorities as civilised and this led to their marginalisation.217 In terms of 
Religion, ethnic minorities include the Hindus, Moslems and other small groups of religion. A 
fact finding report after the 2002 constitution making process that never materialised, the 
Kenyan constitutional review team was advised to include the minorities who are 
marginalised.218   
 
The Kenyan constitution making process will be judged, among other things, according to the 
level at which the minority opinion is included in the constitution making process.  The 
marginalized include those who are disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on one or more 
prohibited grounds.219 This may also mean a community that’s has failed to integrate or unable 
to assimilate and has been kept outside the economic, political and social life of Kenya as a 
whole.220 A report by the Kenya thabitti task force indicates that the constitutional review 
process would address the problems of the marginalized communities in the new 
Constitution.221    
 
4.1.4 The people as the controllers of the agenda 
The Kenyan constitution making process raises more issues and it seems that there have been 
no lessons learnt from the failed Bomas processes which the people rejected because they 
thought the process had been tampered with by the executive.  The executive in Kenya, which is 
mainly the PNU and ODM, have fought on the proposals about the mode of devolution of power 
                                                 
215   JB Ejpbwah Intergrationist and accomodationist measures in Nigeria ‘Constitutional engineering: success 
and failures in S Choudhry constitutional design for divided societies: Integration or Accommodation?  
(2008)  255. 
216           Kituo cha Katiba   Report on constitutional review  exercise in  Kenya, Fact-Finding Mission Visited Kenya 
between 19th and 22nd September, 2001 and again between 26th and 29th February, 2002 ,12 
217  Kituo cha Katiba (n 233 above) 12. 
218  Kituo Cha Katiba (n 233 above) 12. 
219  E Gayim  The concept of minorities in International law ( 2001) 4.  
220  Gayim ( n 218 above ) 5. 
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and the type of government.222 The pushing by the ODM, in support of the Bomas drafts, and 
the agitation by the PNU to consider both the Bomas and the referendum drafts, depicts how the 
political heavy weights have taken over the process that was supposed to be the result of people’s 
consultation.  The differences in approach between the coalition partners will lead to more 
complexities of choice by the people of Kenya. The Kenyan people have in the past rejected the 
parliament‘s role in designing a constitution for Kenya.223 The role of parliament today, 
especially the parliamentary select committee on legal affairs, has been attacked by some 
members of the coalition government as hijacking the power of the people in constitution 
making.224 
 
4.1.5 The level of civic education and awareness campaigns. 
In order for the ordinary Kenyan citizens to effectively participate in the process, they should be 
educated on the process and substance. The process of constitution making assumes that the 
people, as the custodians of the constitution, are well informed, educated and sensitized in order 
to make meaningful choices. There is need for a holistic approach to information sharing and 
education so as to have impartial and accurate content.225   
The Committee of experts in Kenya did not include a civic education programme on its schedule. 
It simply begun with identification of contentious issues and thematic consultations on 
contentious issues.226 The failure to educate the public on the process and the content in 
constitution making is not a new phenomenon in Kenya‘s constitutional making process. Legal 
experts have argued that even the much hailed Bomas process did not have a feature of civic 
education  that the majority of the population did not know the contents of the Bomas Draft.227 
The people only knew what they were told by their leaders and even those who had tried to read 
were only interested in a few chapters and issues in the constitution. 228 Muli notes that while 
the major part of the Bomas Draft indicated the contribution of the Kenyans, there was a need 
                                                 
222  ‘ Bomas ghost threatens to scuttle review’ The Standard 21 May 2009,2 
223   Muli (n 31  above) 3. 
224   Standard (n 101  above) 2 , Mr. Kajwang of the ODM attacks Mr.Mohammed head of the  Parliamentary 
Committee on Legal Affairs for Involving in the Activities of the Committee of Experts. 
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for civic education since the Constitution contained even what the Kenyan people thought were 
alien to them.229  Without a rigorous civic education and mass awareness, one cannot help but 
wonder what type of choice the Kenyan people will make at the referendum, considering that the 
consultation process did not reach  the people. Of course, civic education is demanding in terms 
of resources and man power and costly.  But the process of civic education is as important as the 
outcome and that’s why the coalition government should have improvised other less costly 
means of educating the public without necessarily forgoing the process.  
 
4.1.6 The credibility and competence of the committee of experts  
In order to have an effective civic education and awareness programme, the body charged with 
the constitution making should not only enjoy credibility but it must also be competent to carry 
out the exercise. The selection of the people must be done transparently and they should hold 
office ensuring representation, professional ability and public credibility.230 The road map to the 
Kenyan constitution making process began with an invitation to the members of the public to 
apply for positions as experts in the committee.231 Those who were interviewed and short listed 
had their names forwarded by the parliamentary select committee and the AU panel of eminent 
persons to the National Assembly. 232 
 
4.1.7   Political will as a necessity 
The credibility and competence of the committee of experts cannot guarantee an effective 
process of constitution making without the absence of political will. Kenya‘s history and clamor 
for a constitution review has always been watered down by the leaders and government officers 
                                                 
229  Muli ( 31   above) 3. 
230  Osisa (n 71  above) 26. 
231  <http://www.coekenya.go.ke/> (accessed 6 October 2009).  See the Committee of Experts on 
Constitutional review official website available at <http://www.coekenya.go.ke/> (accessed 6 October 
2009). 
232           (n 231  above ). 
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who are against reforms  in order to  sustain their power and influence.233 The constitution 
making process in Kenya has always been affected by leadership and governance issues.234   
The current process of constitution making are happening at a back ground of a highly divided 
coalition government that espouse diverge interests. While ODM advocates for a parliamentary 
system of government, the PNU advocates for a hybrid system of government. The sharp 
ideological difference between the two major coalition partners, if not resolved, will affect the 
contributions people have made to the constitution making process because of the politicisation 
of the difference. It should be recalled that President Mwai Kibaki supported the watered down 
Referendum Act of 2003 while it is believed that the opposition by Raila Odinga to the 
referendum won the politics of the day. The Bomas Draft was rejected  as a result of  ,what many 
my call, leadership and lack of political will from some leaders. Taking place in the backdrop of 
the recent post election violence and aiming at laying a democratic foundation for 2012 
elections, the constitution making process in Kenya can only succeed if the leaders of the two 
main two coalition partners have political will.   
 
4.1.8 Timing  
Constitution making is both a legal and political process in that the selection of commissioners, 
the drafting and framing are carried out in specific time frames that’s in most case suit the 
government in power than empowering citizens. Time frames are an essential factor in the 
process of constitutional making. Time becomes of special relevance and a political tool in 
situations when the  constitution is the benchmark for the incoming elections. The Kenyan 
history of constitutional making reveals that constitutional issues take centre place mainly 
towards election.  As a result, the process tends to happen in charged political atmosphere. 
The current constitution making process is part of the agreed agenda by the coalition 
government. This means it is not only a legal document but also a political weapon to deal with 
the power struggle especially in so far as the issue of separation of powers is concerned. In a 
context of disputed election that resulted in the loss of lives, there are more expectations to the 
constitution that are peculiar to the Kenyan society. It is in the context of these expectations and 
                                                 
233  The author uses the term leaders to mean the government, opposition, leaders of various groupings 
including political parties. 
234  Osisa (n 71  above) 25. 
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anticipations that the committee of experts has been given 12 months to complete the 
constitution before Kenya goes to elections in 2012. 
There exist no standard time frame of drafting constitutions since each society has a different 
background and history. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the South African,235 the 
Nigerian236 and The Zambian experience237 show the time frame allocated to the process 
matters. The allocation of time for each stage is important and the committee of experts in 
Kenya is under pressure to deliver a constitution before elections in 2012. Although no single 
method of time allocation can apply to all states and states should be flexible in adjusting to the 
necessary changes in the process, the 12 months allocation to the committee of experts seem 
inadequate considering the national coverage. The limitation of time may be politically 
motivated or financial as the review process needs a lot of funding which some states especially 
the third world may not afford. 
 
4.2   A referendum as part of the process. 
The Kenyan referendum politics have been the most controversial and contested stage of the 
constitution making process.238 This is evident from the rejection of the Wako draft by the Raila 
Odinga camp by a vote of 57 percent to 42 percent, despite the hailing of the draft constitution 
by president Kibaki as ‘ one of the most modern and progressive constitutions of the world’ 
marked a turning history of Kenyan constitutional politics.239 The referendum vote saw 
president Kibaki dissolve parliament and the deepening of the rift between president Kibaki and 
his allies the ODM led by the coalition government prime minister Raila Odinga.240 
It is important to understand this event since both Kibaki and Odinga are not only the main 
coalition government partners but they have also presented diverging positions to the 
                                                 
235  Osisa (n 71  above) 28. 
236  Osisa (n 71  above) 28. 
237  The Zambian government states that the process ought to be open ended and can not be rushed and this 
has been criticized as an attempt by the government to delay reforms, for more details see Osisa (n 71   
above)28. 
238  Mutua (n 33 above) see referendum the detailed account of Kenya’ referendum politics from the Wako 
draft to the politics after the referendum’ 227-232. 
239  Mutua (n 33  above) 229 citing ‘Kibaki’s televised speech causes a stir’ in the East African Standard, 
November 21 2005; ‘leaders defy ban on campaign,’ Daily Nation 21 November  2005 1 . 
240  Mutua (n 33  above) 231. 
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Committee of Experts on contentious issues especially the devolution of power.241 In the event 
that there is no consensus reached among the Kibaki and Raila camp, it is certain that the 
constitution review process in Kenya will face another major challenge. Mutua argues that the 
failure of the Wako draft was not due to the undemocratic nature of the government but due to 
the non-consultative nature of president Kibaki and his inability to reach an agreement with 
Raila Odinga.242 The referendum has been politicized, undermining the efforts of the people in 
search for a constitution. Kiplagat noted that ‘Kenyans would want to see a people driven review 
process devoid of political interference’.243 A referendum will be a litmus test to the coalition 
government‘s will to have a new constitution and respond to the erstwhile demand of the 
Kenyan people for a constitution. There are sharp differences between the senior legal advisors 
of both president Kibaki ‘s PNU and Prime Minster Raila Odinga’ s ODM on the form of 
government.244 The Kibaki camp accuses the Committee of Experts of promoting partisan 
interests while the Odinga camp accuses the committee of being dominated by people of certain 
political inclination.245 Legal and political commentators are worried of the referendum as there 
is a danger of repeating the 2005 experience; 
 
At this rate, experts say, chances of Kenya getting a new constitution are very slim. However, it 
is not the wrangles within the Coalition that have commentators worried most, but the 
referendum waiting ahead.246  
 
The chairperson on the committee of experts has also expressed his worries about the 
referendum, citing the major political differences and politicization of the referendum 
politics in Kenya.247  The argument that a Draft Constitution be subjected to a referendum as 
                                                 
241   While Kibaki and the PNU have proposed a hybrid form of government, Odinga and the ODM have 
proposed a parliamentary form of government. see also ‘ we won’t bow to politicians,’ says expert , The 
Standard 01 September 2009 1. 
242  Mutua (n 33   above) 231. 
243  Mutua (n33 above) 232 citing ‘constitution; Kibaki’ pledge on the way forward,’ Daily Nation 31 May 
2006. Bethuel Kiplagat is a respected Kenyan diplomat who was appointed to chair the committee of 
eminent persons to make findings on the on the review process. 
244  ‘We wont bow to politicians’ The  Standard 01 September  2009 1. 
245  ‘ Referendum on new constitution likely to yield to political whims and ethnicity’ Daily Nation 12 October  
2009 1.  
246   The  Standard  (n 2 44  above) 1. 
247  The Standard  (n 244  above ) 1. 
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happened in 2005 has also been received with mixed feelings. There is a view that taking the 
document to a politically-charged electorate for endorsement or rejection is ill-advised.248 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
The normative principles of constitution making must be adhered to in order to have a 
legitimate process that enjoys ownership by the people. The 2005 rejection of the Wako draft 
saw Kenya going to elections in 2007 without a constitution.  The coalition government that 
was formed after the post election violence agreed to take various reforms including 
constitutional reforms as part of agenda four and it was agreed that a constitution would be 
made within 12 months.  There was a sense of optimism that a constitution would be in place 
and the Kenyans would go to elections come December 2012. In order to have a new 
constitutional dispensation, there is need for meaningful participation and civic education. 
More importantly, the value of the political will in guiding the process must be noted. There 
is a danger that the scramble for power and failure to reach agreement by the major stake 
holders of PNU and ODM will frustrate the activities of the Committee of Expert and Kenya 
will go to elections without a constitution.  
 
 
                                                 
248  The standard ( n 244  above)  1.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1. Conclusion 
The study was intended to analyse the concept of public participation in the constitution making 
process in Kenya under the coalition government. The purpose of the research was to examine 
the extent to which the Kenyan constitution making process was a people driven process.  
The coalition government in Kenya set up a constitutional of Kenya review law and a committee 
of experts was designated to carry out the process of consultation and the eventual preparation 
of a constitution.The constitution making process in Kenya has come under tough criticism from 
the public and political parties as having learnt nothing from the previous attempts of 
constitution making in Kenya. The previous constitution making processes were characterized 
by the influence of the political parties and the parliament, excluding ordinary citizens. The 
same seems to be true with the current process. The process has been characterized by failure to 
extensively consult the Kenyan people on the contentious issues. Issues such as land, which is 
one of the underlying issues for most of Kenya’ s political problems,  were never included among 
the contentious issues.249  Furthermore, the role of the various groups and sectors in society like 
the youth, women and those who have been marginalized historically was not well attended to 
by the committee of experts. It is clear that some issues, like women rights, especially succession 
matters, are still controversial owing to the traditional customs and laws. The constitution 
making process could have been opportunity to include those whose rights have been affected 
the past. 
The Kenyan constitution making process is happening at a time where there have been reports 
of partiality and party affiliation of some members of the Committee of experts, leading to 
wrangles within the Committee itself. Although the Committee has denied the accusations, its 
credibility and impartiality remains a doubt among a section of the Kenyan people. The 
constitution making process is happening at a back ground of a coalition government formed 
after the 2007 post election violence which makes the process as important as the substance as it 
seeks to address some of the causes of the post election violence. The differences in views and 
positions by the major coalition partners of ODM and PNU seem to affect the process of 
constitution making. While ODM has strongly presented a parliamentarian form of government, 
                                                 
249   ‘Land also a hot potato, parties tell review team’ The Standard 6 September 2009 1. 
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PNU has proposed a hybrid system and this difference is not only threatening the process but 
will inevitably have an impact on the constitutional referendum. It is a well established practice 
that during the referendum people vote for the parties positions rather than the substance of the 
document.  
The constitution making process in Kenya falls short of the normative standards of constitution 
making especially in so far as the element of inclusiveness is concerned. The same applies to 
civic education. There is no need to include the people who do not understand the contents and 
purpose of the constitution. Although constitution making process are often expensive and 
costly, this should not be a reason not to engage in civic education. Cheap and effective means of 
public awareness should be devised.  
Generally, the constitution making process in Kenya is happening at a right time when the 
Kenyan nation needs to rebuild its society after the post election violence. Constitution making 
processes are political processes and can not be easily detached from the normal governance of 
the country and those in power. Political will remains a necessity in order to have a constitution 
in Kenya before the 2012 election. Unless the major political parties broke a deal and agree to a 
common mission, the existing political climate and suspicion among the coalition partners as 
well as the 12 months deadline for the committee of experts might only mean that the likelihood 
of adopting a constitution that will be rejected by the population through a referendum. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
There is no uniform method of constitution making in the world but there are some basic 
standards that most constitution making states should fulfill in order to have a constitution that 
enjoys legitimacy among the people. This calls for a people driven process and the Kenyan 
constitution making process forms no exception to this principle. 
The Kenyan constitution making process needs to put into consideration the following factors if   
Kenya is to have a constitution before the 2012 elections. 
• The consultation phrase should be revisited again to include not only the target 
groups but all the marginalized members of the society who may include those who 
have never owned land and the internally displace people in Kenya.  
• The consultation phase should include women and youth from both rural and urban 
areas. The Bomas Constitution making process was criticized for not having a fair 
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representation of women where the urban Nairobi based women were proportionally 
more than the others. The number should be determined according to population as 
per region. 
• The public should be given more time to decide on what the contentious issue should 
be and this should not only be the work of a few individuals and the politicians. Critics 
have argued that the failure to extensively include the people has led the committee of 
experts to leave out important issues’ like land and the Islamic khadi courts. However 
sensitive these issues are, failure to subject them to debate is just postponing a 
conflict to later stage.   
• The Committee of Experts ought to act impartially and avoid partisan politics. The 
previous constitution making process have not only been named after their 
chairpersons but also it is evident that the drafters would be linked to party politics.250 
The wrangles between the commissioners affect the credibility of the process and the 
outcome. 
• The parliament and the political parties should not hijack the process from the 
people. It is evident that after the consultation and drafting, the parliamentary select 
committee would need to take the issue to parliament for approval. The Kenyan 
coalition government‘s parliament is fragile with a lot of political animosity between 
the major parties of ODM and PNU. In case, the political parties do not reach a 
compromise on the devolution of power, parliamentary politics will take over the 
prior contributions of the few and target groups that were consulted by the committee 
of experts.  
• There is need to educate the public and an extensive campaign about the 
constitutional making process and the contents especially the bill of rights. The 
people should be informed and educated before they go for the constitutional 
referendum. It has been a practice that during the referendum, the politicians who are 
not satisfied with the process and their personal interests sabotage the process by 
campaigning against the draft constitution. It has been argued that though the Bomas 
Constitution was highly accredited to have been inclusive, the majority who voted for 
and against it did not know the contents of the Constitution.251 
                                                 
  250   See Wako Commission, Ghai Commission etc. 
 251  Kindiki (n 3 above) 4. 
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The presence of efficient and functioning institutions is an important factor in the democratic 
governance and the rule of law. Institutions that are credible and impartial render the process 
and outcome enjoy legality among the people. The people are the primary beneficiaries of the 
constitution. The Kenyan people should be involved meaningfully in the constitution making 
process in order to address the fear and concerns of the people.  The causes and impacts of the 
recent 2007 post election violence should inform the coalition government that an accountable, 
all inclusive and people driven process is the pillar to the foundation of democracy and good 
governance in Kenya. The South African experience indicates that even when the political 
parties have differences, a constitution can be managed and negotiated through tolerance and 
accommodating each other.252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 16,935 words. 
 
                                                 
252   B de Villiers & J Sindane (eds) Managing constitutional change (1996) 336. 
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